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9 MAY 1962

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director (Intelligence)

SUBJECT: Recommendations of the President's Foreign
Intelligence Advisory Board, January 20, 1962

1. Certain of the recommendations applying to the DD/I area which the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board submitted to him on January 20, 1962, were transmitted to you for comment by my memorandum of 13 February 1962. Your comments which were subsequently transmitted to me, together with those of other interested departments and agencies, provided the basis for a report to Mr. McGeorge Bundy by the Director, along with his own comments in each case.

2. The Director has now received from Mr. Bundy a report of the actions taken by the President with respect to each of the subject recommendations, with a request that the Director submit a report by July 2, 1962 on the status of implementation of these actions.

3. For your information, there is attached hereto for each of the subject recommendations previously sent you the following:

- a. The recommendation by the President's Board.
- b. A summary of the comments by the interested departments and agencies, along with those of the Director.
- c. The action taken by the President.
- d. Implementing action which is required to carry out the President's decisions.

4. It is requested that you take appropriate action within the DD/I area to implement the President's decisions as indicated in attachments hereto with respect to the following recommendations:

General Recommendation

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5. It is further requested that I be provided by June 15, 1962 with a report on the status of implementation of the President's decisions regarding the above listed recommendation, for incorporation in a report to Mr. Bundy and to the President's Board.



Lyman B. Kirkpatrick
Executive Director

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Attachments

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General Recommendation No. 1.a.: "When circumstances permit, U. S. Ambassadors be provided an opportunity to comment upon the drafts of proposed national and special intelligence estimates involving countries to which they are accredited or which are geographically or politically related to their areas of assignment."

Comments: The Department of State concurs in this recommendation. The Department of Defense feels that it is a responsibility of the Department of State to ensure that due consideration is given to the views of the Ambassador during the development of the draft, rather than after the draft has been prepared. The Department of Defense points out (a) that occasions will be rare in which time will permit the submission of draft NIEs and SMIEs to the Ambassador for comment prior to consideration and approval by the USIB; (b) that it is unnecessary to obtain comments of the Ambassador on draft estimates, since such draft estimates should, of course, incorporate the views of the Ambassador on developments in the areas, as well as reports from other sources. CIA notes that the State Department frequently requests the views of an Embassy on estimative problems and often sends its contributions to estimates to the field for comment. Time permitting, it also informs appropriate Ambassadors of forthcoming estimates and seeks Embassy guidance on key questions contained in their terms of reference. Moreover, completed estimates are normally sent to the field for Embassy comments and such comments are widely distributed in the intelligence community.

I note that the President's Board has recognized that the time factor is an important element in this recommendation. I am confident that the State Department, in its concurrence, is likewise appreciative of this limitation. The time factor is a very real problem; and while I endorse the principle of taking into account the Ambassador's views, I would be reluctant to establish a system which could lead towards a mandatory requirement for Ambassadorial comment on draft estimates in all cases. I believe the State Department practice achieves the general objectives of this recommendation insofar as is feasible.

Action taken by the President: Approved, noting the concurrence of the Director of Central Intelligence and his view that insofar as feasible the general objectives of this recommendation are being achieved.

Implementing action required: Continue current practice by the Department of State.

General Recommendation No. 1.b.: "The Political Sections of our Embassies, and the Ambassadors in appropriate instances, be given an opportunity to comment upon all political intelligence at the time it is being furnished to Headquarters, except under circumstances in which such action would impose undue delay on the reporting process."

Comments: The Department of State concurs in this recommendation. The Department of Defense and the Central Intelligence Agency have pointed out that present instructions to field representatives and stations provide for giving Embassies the opportunity to comment on all political information reports in some instances, and when time permits, before transmittal of the report to their respective Headquarters, and in other instances simultaneously therewith. CIA's Clandestine Services note that the obtaining of comments almost always entails some delay in transmittal, and that in a very large number of cases any delay is undue delay. The fastest possible dissemination of information to Washington as well as within an Embassy is an overriding responsibility of the intelligence community, and therefore, so far as cable-worthy information is concerned, a delay in transmittal for the purpose of obtaining comments should be the exception rather than the rule. Since, normally, transmittal to Washington and dissemination to the Embassy are virtually simultaneous, a comment made promptly on a disseminated report can be forwarded so as to reach Washington very shortly after the report itself.

In my view, the present instructions and practice employed in the field are in conformity with the specific provisions of NSCID 2 and DCID 2/1 and with the spirit of this recommendation.

Action taken by the President: Approved, noting the concurrence by the Department of State and the view of the Director of Central Intelligence that the spirit of the recommendation is being met.

Implementing action required: Continue current instructions and practices by the Departments of State and Defense and the Central Intelligence Agency.

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Action taken by the President: Approved.

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General Recommendation No. 1.d.: "Efforts be continued, where feasible, to assign U. S. intelligence personnel having special language training to areas where maximum use may be made of their language capabilities."

Comments: The Departments of State and Defense, and the Central Intelligence Agency agree that this is a continuing problem and concur in the need to stress language capabilities in making field assignments. The Department of Defense points out that the problem is complicated by rotating line personnel into and out of the intelligence field and by the length of tour limitations in foreign areas. CIA notes the problem is acute in the areas where rare languages are spoken and in the assignment of officers to the more complex operations, and to supervisory positions overseas, where operational experience and political sophistication are necessary qualifications.

It is evident that this is a problem whose solution must be tempered by a full consideration of all the essential qualifications sought in individuals selected for overseas intelligence assignment.

Action taken by the President: Approved.

Implementing action required: Continued efforts by the Departments of State and Defense and the Central Intelligence Agency to implement this recommendation, tempered by full consideration of all essential qualifications required for overseas intelligence assignment.

General Recommendation No. 1.e.: "When significant intelligence is reported which subsequently proves to be erroneous, procedures be established for appropriate notification to the recipients of the erroneous information."

Comments: The Department of State concurs in this recommendation. The Department of Defense also concurs, and states that as a matter of practice, each military service accomplishes this notification. The Department of Defense also states that to insure compliance within DOD, its importance has recently been reemphasized. The Central Intelligence Agency states that procedures have long been in effect to accomplish this purpose, to the extent that it is practicable.

I am advised that this recommendation is currently being implemented by each agency to the maximum practicable extent.

Action taken by the President: Approved.

Implementing action required: Continued efforts by the Departments of State and Defense and the Central Intelligence Agency to implement this recommendation to the maximum practicable extent.

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Action taken by the President: Noted that this recommendation has been overtaken by events transpiring subsequent to its submission.

Implementing action required: None.

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at AD's lunch hr*

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